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Commercial-Scale Renewable 
Energy in South Africa and its 
Progress to Date*
Lucy Baker
Abstract While South Africa’s electricity sector is heavily coal-dependent,  
the country has recently become an attractive destination for commercial-scale 
renewable energy investment. This article examines ongoing developments 
and challenges to the country’s Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producers’ Procurement Programme (RE IPPPP), from inception as a 
feed-in tariff in 2007, to its launch as a competitive bidding programme 
in 2011. The article discusses how the programme emerged out of a set 
of national conditions combined with international trends in renewable 
energy investment and technology development. The programme’s 
successes include progressive requirements for socioeconomic development. 
However, since 2016, South Africa’s renewable energy industry has faced 
complex challenges, including resistance by the electricity utility Eskom, 
itself embroiled within scandals of state capture and corruption, as 
well as the ability of Eskom’s transmission grid to integrate renewable 
energy generation. Subsequent delays to the programme have generated 
uncertainty for stakeholders and the future of the industry.
Keywords: renewable energy, electricity, South Africa, wind, solar PV, 
renewable energy procurement, Eskom.
1 Introduction
South Africa’s electricity sector is heavily coal-dependent, accounting for 
45 per cent of  the country’s carbon emissions.1 However, in recent years 
the country has become an attractive destination for commercial-scale 
renewable energy investment since the launch of  two key national 
developments in 2011: a procurement programme for utility-scale 
renewable energy, and a national electricity master plan which set a target 
for renewable energy to deliver 9 per cent of  supply by 2030. Though 
South Africa’s electricity sector is still dominated by the state-owned, 
largely coal-fired monopoly utility Eskom, renewable electricity generated 
by independent power producers (IPPs) now constitutes a small but 
significant contribution to the overall electricity mix.
102 | Baker Commercial-Scale Renewable Energy in South Africa and its Progress to Date
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
South Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers’ 
Procurement Programme (RE IPPPP) and the Integrated Resource Plan 
for electricity (IRP) emerged after various failed attempts to liberalise 
the country’s electricity sector in the post-apartheid era (Baker 2017). 
The introduction of  RE IPPPP facilitated the generation of  electricity 
from both renewable energy sources and by IPPs for the first time, and 
has since attracted just over R200 billion2 in investment. RE IPPPP’s 
trajectory and that of  the industry it has generated have been influenced 
by a number of  developments at the international and national 
levels, including a dramatic decline in the cost of  renewable energy 
technologies, as a result of  which solar photovoltaic (PV) has become 
competitive with new build coal; enormous electricity tariff hikes in 
South Africa in recent years; and a decline in the country’s economic 
growth and related energy demand.
Yet despite RE IPPPP’s initial successes, a complexity of  political, 
economic, and technical challenges have led to delays which now 
threaten its future sustainability and have generated significant 
uncertainty for renewable energy investors and stakeholders. Revisions 
to the IRP are also severely delayed. As a result of  such challenges, 
South Africa has fallen in the rankings of  Ernst & Young’s renewable 
energy attractiveness index and now sits in 19th place, down from 11th 
in May 2016 (EY 2017).3 But as Africa’s first mover in renewable energy 
development, South Africa’s progress or lack thereof  will have inevitable 
lessons and spillovers for other countries on the continent where 
renewable energy activities are currently developing, including Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Namibia.
This article focuses on the commercial-scale, grid-connected renewable 
energy sector that has emerged out of  RE IPPPP thus far, for which the 
technologies permitted are: onshore wind, solar PV, concentrated solar 
power (CSP), small hydro, biomass, biogas, landfill gas, small hydro, 
and cogeneration (from agricultural waste). Of  this, 43 per cent is for 
wind and 42 per cent for solar PV. RE IPPPP must be differentiated 
from other private sector-led electricity generation activities ongoing in 
South Africa which go beyond the scope of  this article, and include a 
programme for IPPs from coal, gas, and cogeneration yet to be finalised 
(Baker and Burton, forthcoming), and a small but growing roof-top solar 
PV market (Korsten 2015).
The article’s structure is as follows: Section 2 situates RE IPPPP within 
the context of  the country’s electricity sector, including the state-owned 
monopoly Eskom. Section 3 discusses some of  the key policy developments 
that helped to pave the way for RE IPPPP, including the 1998 White Paper 
on Energy Policy, the 2003 Renewable Energy White Paper, and the IRP, 
the country’s first national planning document for electricity. As discussed, 
while the IRP paved the way for RE IPPPP, subsequent hold-ups in 
the revision of  this plan have undermined gains towards a transparent 
and participatory planning process. Section 4 goes on to examine the 
emergence of  RE IPPPP as a competitive bidding auction, despite original 
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plans for a feed-in tariff. This section includes some of  the impressive 
gains made as a result of  the programme’s progressive socioeconomic 
developments, in addition to emerging challenges as a result of  delays 
to the programme. Section 5 explores some of  the reasons behind these 
challenges including Eskom’s resistance to the programme and the 
ongoing crisis within the utility which have resulted in its investment 
downgrade. Section 6 concludes that renewable energy procurement in 
South Africa cannot be understood, or resolved, without engaging with the 
very complex political economy in which it is embedded.
2 South Africa’s electricity sector in context and the emergence of 
RE IPPPP
It is impossible to understand the emergence and development of  South 
Africa’s renewable energy procurement programme without examining 
the broader context of  the country’s national electricity sector, including 
the role of  the state-owned monopoly Eskom. With a nominal installed 
capacity of  42.8GW, of  which 85 per cent is coal-fired (Eskom 2016; see 
Figure 1), Eskom owns the transmission grid, generates approximately 
95 per cent of  the country’s electricity supply, and is responsible 
for 60 per cent of  distribution, with the remainder being sold by 
municipalities. Eskom is also the single buyer of  power. The utility has 
historically focused on large-scale centralised supply, building some of  
the world’s largest coal-fired power plants.
While coal will continue to play an important role in the electricity mix for 
some decades, Eskom’s historical dependence on South Africa’s abundant 
sources of  formerly low-cost coal is subject to change due to reasons that 
include national commitments to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
and significant shifts in the coal market (Burton and Winkler 2014). As 
discussed in Section 5, following over a decade of  periodic load-shedding,4 
Eskom is also undergoing a financial and political crisis and is front and 
centre of  a national scandal on state capture and corruption.
South Africa’s relative isolation under apartheid meant that the country 
avoided the global trend of  electricity sector liberalisation pushed by 
the World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral donors as part 
of  structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). While Eskom retained its monopoly as 
a state-owned utility, there are long-standing tensions and a spectrum of  
ideological differences in South Africa and its ruling party the African 
National Congress (ANC), between those advocating for state ownership 
of  the electricity sector at one end and those for liberalisation and market 
reform at the other. Eskom has long resisted the introduction of  IPPs and 
the creation of  an Independent Systems Operator for transmission as 
this would undermine its current monopoly control (Baker and Burton, 
forthcoming). As discussed in Section 3, such tensions are illustrated in 
the failure to fully implement measures put forward in the 1998 White 
Paper on Energy Policy which ultimately led to delays to the construction 
of  new generation capacity in the early 2000s. Current delays to 
RE IPPPP are arguably continued illustration of  such tensions.
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Source Eskom (2016: 128).
To put Eskom’s generation capacity into perspective, the 
commercial-scale renewable energy capacity that has emerged out of  
RE IPPPP accounted for approximately 2.9 per cent of  the country’s 
electricity supply in 2016 (CSIR 2017a). Under RE IPPPP, 92 projects 
constituting just over 6,300MW of  peak generating capacity have been 
approved under four bidding rounds and are now at various stages of  
development (IPPP Office 2017; see Table 2). By the first quarter of  
2017, 3,052MW of  electricity generation capacity from 56 IPP projects 
were connected to the national grid and all of  the projects approved 
under rounds one and two of  RE IPPPP were operational (IPPP 
Office 2017).
Alongside RE IPPPP as a programme for utility-scale projects, a small 
IPP programme was launched in 2013 for projects of  between 1MW 
and 5MW. This gives bidders the option to use equipment supplied by 
‘South African power generation equipment manufacturers, who may 
not have international certification,’5 unlike the main RE IPPPP which 
insists on internationally certified technologies.
Since mid-2015, electricity generated by solar PV and wind has 
become cost-competitive with that generated by Eskom’s new build 
coal-fired power plants, Medupi and Kusile. Such a development follows 
global trends which see solar PV and wind reaching grid parity with 
conventional sources of  energy generation (UNEP/BNEF 2015). Since 
the start of  RE IPPPP, the tariffs at which winning projects will sell their 
electricity to Eskom have dropped dramatically: the average solar PV 
tariff has decreased by 75 per cent, wind by 50 per cent, and CSP by 
43 per cent (see Table 1). RE IPPPP also accounts for one of  the largest 
investment streams into the country in recent years (Green Cape 2017). 
At the time of  writing, just over R200 billion6 for both debt and equity 
had been committed, of  which 24 per cent is foreign investment (IPPP 
Office 2017: 2).
Figure 1 Eskom’s nominal capacity in MW
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Yet despite such progress, and as discussed in further detail in Section 4, 
the more recent bidding rounds of  RE IPPPP have been beset by 
delays and uncertainty. Winning projects selected under round four 
were announced in April 2015, with a second announcement generally 
referred to as round 4.5, taking place in June 2015. But financial close 
for these projects which should have been reached by April 2016, 
has been stalled due to Eskom’s continued refusal to sign the power 
purchase agreements (PPAs). A fifth round, which was slated to be 
announced in 2016 has been put on hold with no clarity at the time 
of  writing. Under the small IPP programme, ten successful projects 
amounting to 49MW have been announced thus far but have also yet to 
reach financial close.
Table 1 Actual average tariffs, rounds 1–4 of RE IPPPP
Tariffs Round 1 
(Nov. 2011)
Round 2 
(March 2012)
Round 3 
(Aug. 2013)
Round 4 
(Nov. 2015)
Average 
percentage 
drop,  
Round 1–4
Wind R 1.52 R 1.19 R 0.87 R 0.62 50%
Solar PV R 3.65 R 2.18 R 1.17 R 0.62 75%
CSP R 3.55 R 3.32 R 3.11 R 2.02
Source Adapted from CSIR (2017a: 5).
Table 2 Project status under each bidding round of RE IPPPP rounds
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 3.5 
(CSP only)
Round 4/4.5 Round 5 Small IPP 
(project size 
1–5MW) 
Submission 
date
November 
2011
March 2012 August 2013 March 2014 August 2014 Should have 
taken place 
in mid-2016. 
Process now 
stalled
October 2013
Number 
of projects 
approved
28 projects 19 projects 17 projects 2 projects 26 projects N/A 10 projects
Contracted 
capacity
1,425MW 1,040MW 1,457MW 200MW 2,205MW 
procured but 
not signed
N/A 49MW 
procured but 
not signed
Date of 
financial close
November 
2012
May 2013 December 
2014
August 2016 Not yet  
signed
N/A Not yet signed
Operational Yes Yes 9 projects by 
March 2017
No N/A No
Source Compiled from DoE (2016), CSIR (2017a: 4), IPPP Office (2017).
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3 Key policy developments
A number of  national and international developments paved the way 
for the emergence of  what is now RE IPPPP. These include, firstly, 
national commitments to climate change mitigation following President 
Jacob Zuma’s pledge to reduce carbon emissions by 34 per cent by 
2020 and 42 per cent by 2025 below a business-as-usual trajectory 
at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) conference in 2009 (RSA 2015). Secondly, the 2008 
global financial crisis contributed to a slump in the renewable energy 
markets of  Europe and the US, which led developers and technology 
manufacturers to seek new opportunities elsewhere, including in South 
Africa. Thirdly, policy developments at the national level played a key 
role, including the 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy, the 2003 White 
Paper and the IRP, as is now discussed.
The 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy (DME 1998) set out the 
gradual liberalisation of  Eskom’s functions into separate generation, 
distribution, and transmission companies (Gaunt 2008). The subsequent 
Eskom Conversion Act of  2001 converted the utility from a statutory 
body to a public company which required that it pay tax and dividends 
for the first time. Eskom’s stakeholder-based electricity council was 
replaced by a board of  directors and the government, represented by 
the Minister of  Public Enterprises, was appointed as the utility’s sole 
shareholder. The White Paper was followed by a 2001 cabinet memo 
announcing that 30 per cent of  electricity supply would be generated by 
IPPs and a subsequent ruling that Eskom no longer be allowed to build 
new electricity generation.
Despite these initial steps, key aspects of  the 1998 White Paper were 
never implemented, including the creation of  a separate transmission 
company. Indeed, the Independent Systems and Market Operator Bill 
that would do this has been continually postponed to date. Significantly, 
between 1998 and 2003 no new generation was built, reasons for which 
include resistance from Eskom and the unions, lack of  capacity from 
the then Department of  Minerals and Energy, and a lack of  regulatory 
clarity that discouraged potential investors (Eberhard 2007; Baker et al. 
2015). By 2007, the country was faced with a falling electricity reserve 
margin and an imminent electricity crisis so in a volte-face, a cabinet 
memo approved that Eskom should be re-allowed to construct more 
power plants but that 30 per cent of  new generation should be built 
by IPPs. While the power sector reform envisaged by the White Paper 
was never completed, it still represents an early attempt to achieve what 
RE IPPPP ultimately managed to do.
A subsequent policy development was the Renewable Energy White 
Paper, published by the Department of  Minerals and Energy in 2003 
with support from Danish bilateral assistance. This paper set a target 
of  10,000GWh of  renewable energy contribution to final energy 
consumption by 2013, to be produced mainly from biomass, wind, 
solar, and small-scale hydro (DME 2003). Though the paper was 
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never formally adopted and the renewable energy commitment it 
proposed was minimal, it nonetheless provided a stimulus for the initial 
development of  a feed-in tariff, which was to have created a market 
mechanism in order to meet this target.
Some years later, the introduction of  the country’s first electricity 
planning document in May 2011, the IRP, set a renewable energy target 
of  17,800MW, which if  built would deliver 9 per cent of  electricity 
supply by 2030. The IRP is significant because it represents the first 
time that electricity planning has taken place in South Africa and while 
the plan’s negotiation was delayed and heavily contested, it was still 
considered something of  a breakthrough (Baker et al. 2015). Not least 
under apartheid there was no formal process for electricity planning 
and policymaking and no department dedicated to it either. Instead, this 
role was carried out by Eskom, which took all decisions for electricity 
new build. It was not until the Electricity Regulation Act, introduced in 
2006, that the necessary powers for the country’s Department of  Energy 
(DoE) (created in 2009 which took over the energy policy function 
from the former Department of  Minerals and Energy) to conduct an 
open planning process for electricity were established. Under the Act, 
responsibility was formally allocated to the energy minister to approve 
the construction of  new generation capacity and what the source of  
that capacity should be. Before an electricity generation project can be 
granted a licence by the country’s electricity regulator, it must align with 
the technological allocations set by the IRP. The IRP also claims to be 
consistent with a carbon emissions constraint of  275 million tonnes of  
carbon dioxide annually after 2024 (DoE 2011: 6).
However, subsequent revisions of  the IRP, in keeping with the requirement 
that the plan be updated every two years have stalled. A second revision 
was released in 2013 for public comment (DoE 2013) but was never 
formally adopted by the government. The main reason attributed to this 
was because the draft advised against the construction of  9.6GW of  new 
nuclear capacity included in the original plan. There are two main reasons 
for this advice: firstly, due to a decline in economic growth and reduced 
energy intensity in the economy, the 2013 draft projected a lower electricity 
demand up until 2030 and by implication a reduced requirement for the 
construction of  new capacity. Secondly, the draft questioned the high 
associated costs of  nuclear technology, stating that ‘the revised demand 
projections suggest that no new nuclear baseload capacity is required until 
after 2025 (and for lower demand not until at earliest 2035)’ (DoE 2013: 8). 
As further discussed in Section 5, the potential nuclear programme is being 
pushed by the presidency and some factions of  Eskom, and is an area of  
high political and economic controversy.
A second IRP draft was released in late 2016 for which a country-wide 
consultation process was held with a closing date for comments of  
early February 2017.7 Key concerns expressed by the renewable 
energy industry and civil society about this document are that it places 
constraints on the uptake of  renewable energy and assumes that 
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the prices of  renewable energy technologies are much higher than 
those reflected in the recent tariffs submitted under RE IPPPP (CSIR 
2017b). By mid-2017, at the time of  writing, the latest draft of  the IRP 
had yet to be finalised. As a result of  such delays, the only valid IRP 
document is now five years out of  date and based on assumptions that 
no longer apply. It has been argued that despite the gains that the first 
IRP represented in terms of  increased transparency in post-apartheid 
energy policymaking, the stalling of  both the 2013 and 2016 versions 
signals a return to highly secretive decision-making, characteristic of  
decision-making in energy under apartheid (Baker et al. 2015). Such 
uncertainty is but one of  various challenges facing the future of  the 
country’s renewable energy sector. Before exploring these challenges in 
greater depth, the emergence of  RE IPPPP is discussed in Section 4.
4 From REFIT to RE IPPPP
The original mechanism to stimulate South Africa’s utility-scale 
renewable energy sector was to have been in the form of  a feed-in 
tariff, referred to as REFIT, which was originally developed in 2007 
by individuals within the electricity regulatory division of  the national 
energy regulator, supported by others from within the Treasury, 
the Department of  Public Enterprises, and the Department of  
Environmental Affairs, in addition to bilateral technical assistance from 
Germany and Denmark (Baker 2017). One of  REFIT’s stated objectives 
was to create a market mechanism that would ‘kick start and stimulate 
the renewable energy industry in South Africa’ in order to meet the 
target of  10,000GWh of  renewable energy by 2013, as set out in the 
2003 Renewable Energy White Paper discussed in Section 3.
A feed-in tariff pays IPPs a fixed price for each unit of  renewable 
electricity that they sell to the grid, which is set at a higher rate than 
the retail price of  electricity generated from conventional resources. In 
comparison, under a competitive bidding system or auction, potential 
project developers bid for a renewable energy contract below a 
certain tariff cap. Because the latter system is more competitive, it has 
become the preferred global model of  renewable energy procurement 
(EY 2014). After a number of  years of  protracted negotiation, 
REFIT was scrapped unexpectedly in August 2011 and replaced by a 
competitive bidding system in the form of  RE IPPPP (Baker 2017).
Crucially, the launch of  RE IPPPP provided the much-needed certainty 
to investors, not least for its 20-year government-backed, local currency-
denominated PPA, which protects project developers from the risks 
posed by a fluctuating rand and from any potential failure of  Eskom 
to pay for the electricity generated. Under RE IPPPP, Eskom’s role 
is reduced to the designated buyer of  power, while project selection 
and evaluation is carried out by the IPP-unit. The IPP-unit was set 
up by National Treasury’s Public Private Partnership unit together 
with foreign technical consultants to deal specifically with RE IPPPP 
in light of  the DoE’s lack of  capacity to manage a renewable energy 
procurement programme (more recent developments in relation to 
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the IPP-unit are discussed in further detail in Section 5). RE IPPPP 
was internationally lauded for its high-quality regulatory framework, 
tough qualification criteria, and strong economic development and 
community ownership requirements, and subsequently created an 
investment climate that quickly became very popular with international 
renewable energy developers, technology suppliers, and engineering and 
construction companies.
A notable feature of  RE IPPPP is its progressive requirements for 
socioeconomic development which align closely with priorities outlined in 
various national plans and documents on growth and industrial policy such 
as the National Development Plan, the New Growth Path and the Green 
Economy Accord. Scoring of  bids is allocated 70 per cent on the tariff 
at which IPPs will sell electricity to Eskom and 30 per cent on economic 
development criteria, which includes factors such as job creation, 
local content requirements, participation of  historically disadvantaged 
individuals, rural development, community ownership, and skills 
development. The socioeconomic development criteria must be met before 
the price submission will be considered with successful bids being the ones 
that meet the requirements at the lowest price. Such requirements are 
particularly significant given South Africa’s high levels of  unemployment, 
socioeconomic, and racial inequality, and a national skills deficit.
RE IPPPP also requires that project companies, most of  which are 
special purpose vehicles set up for the exclusive purposes of  developing, 
operating, and owning the project, have a minimum of  40 per cent 
shareholding by national companies, of  which a minimum of  12 per 
cent to be held by black economic empowerment companies8 and a 
2.5 per cent shareholding by the local community within a 50km radius 
of  the project site.
Such requirements have resulted in some impressive gains. According to 
Green Cape (2017: 21), over 24,000 job years have been created from 
RE IPPPP, including in the phase of  project construction, and operation 
and maintenance of  numerous plants and equipment manufacturing. 
Community shareholders in projects approved under rounds one to 
four of  RE IPPPP are set to benefit from an income of  R29 billion9 
over the 20-year duration of  the projects. A number of  educational 
initiatives have also been set up for the creation of  ‘green technical 
skills’, including at various colleges across the country. For instance, 
the establishment of  the South African Renewable Energy Technology 
Centre (SARETEC) in the Western Cape offers internationally 
accredited courses for wind turbine and solar PV service technicians.
RE IPPPP’s local content requirements which require that a certain 
percentage of  project spend be dedicated to locally procured equipment, 
services, and skills have helped to facilitate the establishment of  a number 
of  manufacturing and assembly plants mainly for wind towers, solar PV 
panels and invertors. The bulk of  investment in this area has thus far gone 
to the Western Cape Province including the Atlantis Special Economic 
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Zone (Green Cape 2017: 36). Given that the local content percentage has 
increased with each round, by round three all wind towers should have 
been manufactured in-country. Studies for the potential of  the localisation 
of  wind solar PV, and CSP industries have been carried out by various 
different departments and/or donors and private sector institutions 
(DTI 2015; Ahlfeldt 2013; SASTELA 2013). This is in addition to the 
approval of  the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act in May 2014 which 
provides financial and other incentives for investment in renewable energy 
manufacturing (DTI 2013). The aim of  an SEZ is to keep as much of  
the value chain process in one place by supporting a larger manufacturer 
that would then allow small, medium and micro enterprises and smaller 
suppliers to input into the value chain through logistics, transport, and 
other services (Baker and Sovacool 2017).
However, despite the positive developments generated by local content 
requirements, delays to the programme discussed in further detail in 
Section 5 have had a knock-on effect on the manufacturing industry. For 
instance, in June 2017 the heavy manufacturing company DCD sold 
its share of  the R536 million DCD wind tower manufacturing plant 
to South Africa’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), which 
already owned a 20 per cent share, for a mere R1 (Allix 2017).10 The 
plant has also had to lay off employees. In the solar PV industry, two 
leading inverter manufacturers, Germany’s SMA and AEG, that both 
set up in South Africa in 2014 with the aim of  supplying to RE IPPPP 
projects, shut down in 2016, citing the programme’s delays as the main 
reason why (Hopson 2016). Others, including Trina Solar refrained from 
setting up a manufacturing plant in the first place (Creamer 2015).
A further contributing factor has been the manipulation of  local content 
requirements by some developers, particularly in the case of  solar PV in 
the first three rounds (Baker and Sovacool 2017). Because local content 
is measured in spend, some developers have met the requirements by 
purchasing non-module items such as civil works, grid connections, and 
inverters and importing their modules from abroad (Deign 2016), an act 
that violates the spirit of  the requirements, if  not the letter of. This has 
been exacerbated by the absence of  import duties on solar PV modules 
into South Africa, which tends to give the advantage to imported PV 
modules which are usually cheaper (Mulcahy 2012), despite the pressure 
that South African manufacturers have put on the DTI.
In terms of  ownership of  the country’s emerging renewable energy 
industry, there is also concern that RE IPPPP has privileged large 
international companies over national ones, reflecting the increasing 
global consolidation of  the renewable energy industry. Such companies, 
including global majors such as Mainstream Renewable Power, 
Enel Green Power, Abengoa, Acciona, and Scatec Solar, have had 
sufficient capital to withstand the various delays in the programme’s 
implementation and have been able to submit winning bids with very 
low prices in a process that has become increasingly competitive (Baker 
2015). Some of  the causes of  such delays are now discussed in Section 5.
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5 Key challenges for renewable energy in South Africa
Beyond the uncertainties in electricity planning discussed in Section 3, 
the stability and future development of  the country’s renewable energy 
industry is threatened by a number of  challenges. These include 
severe delays to the programme due to the refusal by Eskom to sign 
37 outstanding PPAs; the downgrading of  Eskom’s investment credit 
rating together with that of  the national economy in June 2017; 
management scandals and allegations of  corruption linked to Eskom, 
itself  part of  broader national political turmoil; and emerging evidence 
of  state capture in relation to the nuclear programme being pushed by 
Eskom and the Presidency (Bhorat et al. 2017).
One key obstacle to the rollout of  utility-scale renewable energy 
in South Africa is the cost of  upgrading the transmission grid and 
substations to absorb growing levels of  renewable generation. As 
RE IPPPP has progressed, grid constraints have become increasingly 
prevalent and there is now very limited capacity for project connection 
in areas with good wind and solar resources (Baker et al. 2015: 38). 
This is particularly the case in the Northern Cape Province where the 
majority of  solar PV and CSP projects are located. Under RE IPPPP, 
Eskom is required to cover the costs of  strengthening the transmission 
network and upgrading substations to connect projects, while IPPs pay 
to connect their projects to the grid. However, as Eskom is not involved 
in project selection, it has been unable to determine grid reinforcement 
needs until the winning projects have been announced and so has not 
been able to provide geographical incentives to IPPs. Consequently, it 
is likely that grid availability will be taken into account in future rounds 
when assessing bid submissions (Green Cape 2017: 27).
A further potential challenge to RE IPPPP is the announcement made 
in May 2017 by the DoE that the IPP-unit is to be incorporated into the 
country’s Central Energy Fund, a state-owned company that currently 
owns PetroSA and the Strategic Fuel Fund (Creamer 2017b). This 
move is significant and unexplained given that the IPP-unit has been 
highly respected as a high-quality, transparent, and secure professional 
body since being established in 2011, because as Eberhard, Kolker 
and Leigland suggest, it ‘did not start out with the level of  mistrust of  
private business that sometimes characterises other government agencies 
in South Africa’ (2014: 9). As discussed in Section 4, while the unit 
functions on behalf  of  the DoE, it sits outside of  formal departmental 
governmental structures. The incorporation of  the unit into the Central 
Energy Fund has been met with caution by industry, not least given the 
fund’s history of  poor governance (Paton 2017).
Most significantly, Eskom has refused to sign PPAs for 37 projects 
approved under RE IPPPP. While round five was to have been 
announced in 2016, by mid-2017 this was yet to happen and no capacity 
has been procured since 2015. Eskom’s resistance to RE IPPPP began to 
be felt in late 2015 when it announced that it would not provide budget 
quotes, which indicate the potential cost for a renewable energy project 
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to connect to the grid. The utility then announced in July 2016 that it 
would not sign any new PPAs with IPPs beyond those selected under 
the expedited round four of  RE IPPPP, and refused to sign a PPA for a 
CSP project approved under round three. Eskom’s refusal to sign PPAs 
is an act that goes beyond its mandate, given that it is the DoE’s role to 
make policy on energy under the 2006 Electricity Regulation Act. The 
move, which represents a clear attempt by the utility to challenge the 
procurement of  further independent power generation, was eventually 
condemned by the Treasury and the DoE in September 2016 (Creamer 
2016). However, nearly a year later the impasse endures, despite a pledge 
by Jacob Zuma in February 2017 in his ‘state of  the nation’ address that 
the PPAs would be signed in April 2017. The utility has not provided 
a formal reason as to why it has refused to sign the PPAs, though it has 
claimed firstly that it will make a loss on having to purchase energy from 
IPPs (SAREC 2017), and secondly that the country’s energy supply has 
stabilised since the most recent round of  load-shedding in 2014/15 and 
therefore additional capacity from renewable energy is unnecessary. In its 
2016 annual report, Eskom stated that the purchase of  electricity from 
IPPs accounts for 18 per cent of  primary energy but contributes only 
4 per cent of  the electricity generated (Eskom 2016: 91).
Such resistance by Eskom takes place within the context of  a long-term 
financial and supply-side crisis within the utility for reasons that are 
entrenched and complex (Baker et al. 2015). The latest symptoms of  
this crisis have resulted in periodic load-shedding since 2006 and led 
to unsustainably high levels of  debt, despite large state bail-outs and 
a loan from the World Bank as a ‘lender of  last resort’ in 2010 for the 
controversial Medupi coal-fired power plant. Eskom’s average electricity 
prices increased by approximately 200 per cent between 2008 and 
2016,11 and current tariff decisions are now the subject of  legal review 
(Baker and Burton, forthcoming). There have also been substantial 
cost overruns in the utility’s new build programme, including in the 
4.8GW Medupi and Kusile coal-fired power plants. For the time being, 
electricity supply has now stabilised, due to reasons that include the 
operationalisation of  the first unit of  the Medupi coal-fired plant; 
the introduction of  renewable energy from IPPs; and perhaps most 
significantly, a decline in economic growth and energy demand from the 
country’s energy-intensive industrial users in recent years.
However, Eskom is still very much in crisis and has been subject to 
repeated scandal over its management, and allegations of  corruption 
and state capture. Firstly, a corruption investigation is taking place into 
the contracts between Eskom’s power stations and their coal suppliers, in 
particular the irregular sale of  the Optimum coal mine (which supplies 
to the Arnot coal-fired power station) by mining giant Glencore to a 
company owned by the Indian Gupta family, which has been found 
to have increasing influence over President Jacob Zuma and his allies. 
Eskom has stated its refusal and/or inability to make information public 
regarding its coal supply contracts and volumes burned by each power 
station (Creamer 2017a). A high-profile investigation into state capture 
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by the country’s Public Protector, published in November 2016, heavily 
implicated the then chief  executive of  Eskom, Brian Molefe. Molefe 
swiftly resigned but in several highly controversial twists was then 
reappointed in early May 2017 and subsequently fired again by the end 
of  the month. In April 2017, Business Leadership South Africa called for 
Eskom to replace its board. In June, the Chairman of  Eskom resigned. 
Such developments contributed to the downgrading of  the country’s 
foreign currency debt to junk status in April 2017 by both S&P Global 
Ratings and Fitch Ratings (Bisseker 2017) while Eskom was subsequently 
downgraded to junk status by all three ratings agencies in June 2017.
Despite this, Eskom, backed by the presidency, seems set to pursue its 
plans for a 9,600MW, state-driven nuclear fleet against all odds: President 
Zuma’s unexpected cabinet shuffle in March 2017 removed finance 
minister Pravin Gordhan because of  his alleged opposition to the nuclear 
programme and installed a new energy minister believed to be in favour 
of  it. The revised nuclear determination of  December 2016 transferred 
nuclear procurement responsibilities from the DoE to Eskom and the 
South African Nuclear Energy Corporation. In a case brought by the 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) Earth Life South Africa and 
SAFCEI in late April 2017, the Western Cape High Court judged that 
the intergovernmental agreements on nuclear cooperation signed in 
2014 between South Africa and five countries were unconstitutional and 
unlawful, particularly in the case of  the agreement signed between Eskom 
and Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom (Ensor 2017). The 
court further judged that the two determinations released to allow for the 
nuclear procurement process were irrational, illegal, and unconstitutional 
(Creamer 2017b). Despite this ruling, the government has since 
announced that the nuclear procurement programme will start afresh. 
Given the centralised nature of  the technology, it would seem that nuclear 
power would serve to bolster the interests of  a monopoly-controlled 
electricity system whilst marginalising that of  renewable energy.
6 Conclusion
This article has provided an insight into some of  the challenges to what 
was until recently deemed to be a highly successful renewable energy 
programme. Such challenges include resistance to RE IPPPP by the 
country’s monopoly utility Eskom which has refused to sign outstanding 
PPAs; delays to the revision of  the IRP which would provide certainty on 
the allocation of  future electricity generation capacity; the downgrading 
of  both Eskom’s and the country’s investment rating; related allegations of  
state capture and corruption; attempts by the presidency to push through a 
large nuclear fleet; and uncertainty over the ability of  Eskom’s transmission 
grid to integrate increasing levels of  renewable energy generation.
As discussed, ownership and control over South Africa’s electricity 
generation, transmission, and distribution remains complex, contested, 
and political. Decision-making and changes within the country’s 
electricity sector are embedded within complex social, political, 
and economic forces and relationships. Faced with a financial and 
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supply-side crisis and now at junk investment rating, Eskom is now 
challenged by a small but significant programme for renewable energy 
independent power production. Yet due to the utility’s resistance, the 
future of  this programme is stalled, and the IRP that has played such 
a key role in opening possibilities for the development of  renewable 
energy generation is also on hold. Meanwhile, the uncertainty generated 
by Eskom’s crisis and the broader political scandals to which it is 
linked have discouraged potential investors. The rapid development of  
renewable energy markets elsewhere, for instance in Mexico, Argentina, 
Chile, and Morocco, are overtaking South Africa’s original successes.
In parallel, a contested and secretive process for the procurement of  
nuclear power looks subject to continue, despite legal rulings to the 
contrary. Such a programme, if  it goes ahead, would be procured 
and paid for by the state and in turn electricity consumers, but be 
constructed and supplied by a foreign company. What then do such 
developments represent for the future of  RE IPPPP, in addition to 
other structures of  the country’s electricity governance upon which the 
renewable energy programme depends?
While a number of  Eskom’s challenges are undoubtedly technical, 
particularly with regard to connecting growing levels of  renewable 
energy projects to the grid, recent developments highlight the extent to 
which the utility has been able to subvert the procurement of  renewable 
energy. Large-scale and successful deployment of  renewable energy 
threatens Eskom’s existing monopoly and the preferred technologies 
that serve to uphold it: coal and nuclear power. The introduction of  
nuclear power would strengthen Eskom’s monopoly stronghold and the 
paradigm of  large-scale, centralised, and state-owned supply.
The scenario examined here seems to present a dichotomy that pits a 
deeply entrenched, coal-fired, state-controlled monopoly utility at one 
end that seeks to develop nuclear in order to perpetuate its stronghold, 
against an emerging privately generated renewable energy industry 
on the other that is pushing for a shift in infrastructure towards an 
increasingly flexible electricity grid. While such a dichotomy may be 
simplistic, such dynamics illustrate long-standing national tensions as 
discussed in Section 2 over who should govern, generate, and control 
electricity. These tensions are compounded by significant and increasingly 
rapid innovations in the technologies that generate electricity. Indeed, the 
increase in generation from intermittent and variable resources such as 
wind and solar PV requires much greater flexibility of  grid management 
than South Africa’s current model can provide. This raises a key question 
with regard to the ownership and management of  the country’s electricity 
grid, with the continued failure to create an independent transmissions 
operator as a critical factor in this discussion.
Meanwhile, Eskom and related coalitions within the ruling party are 
now subject to increasing scrutiny as the networks of  state capture, 
in which institutions of  electricity governance are deeply embroiled, 
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start to unravel. Will this scrutiny provide the opportunity that the 
renewable energy industry needs to overcome the political, economic, 
and technical obstacles currently blocking its continued development 
and allow it to resume its previous successes in a way that prioritises the 
national interest?
Notes
*  The work for this article was supported by the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) grant number: EP/K011790/1 
(Research Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand) and the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) grant number: ES/N014138/1.
1 At 215.6Mt CO2 emissions in 2015 (Eskom 2016).
2 Approximately US$15.4 billion based on July 2017 exchange rates. 
Note that there are differing reports of  this investment, probably due 
to fluctuating exchange rates between the rand and the dollar. For 
instance, Eberhard and Kåberger (2016) state that US$19 billion was 
invested between 2010 and 2016.
3 Countries that have overtaken it include the middle-income 
economies of  Morocco, now in 14th place and Argentina in 12th.
4 Load-shedding refers to planned interruption of  the electricity supply 
in order to manage supply-side constraints.
5 www.ipp-smallprojects.co.za/.
6 Approximately US$15.4 billion based on July 2017 exchange rates.
7 www.sapvia.co.za/integrated-resource-plan-irp-consultation-
workshop-dates/.
8 Black economic empowerment refers to legislation introduced 
in the post-apartheid era to attempt to address socioeconomic 
marginalisation along racial lines.
9 Approximately US$2.2 billion at July 2017 exchange rates.
10 The wind tower manufacturing plant, which opened in 2014, was 
a joint initiative between the DCD Group, the IDC, and the Coega 
Development Corporation, which manages the Coega industrial 
development zone in which the plant is located.
11 Calculated from Eskom’s figures: www.eskom.co.za/CustomerCare/
TariffsAndCharges/Pages/Tariff_History.aspx.
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